Standing Committee F

[Sir John Butterfill in the Chair]

Civil Contingencies Bill

Clause 3 - Section 2: supplemental

Question proposed [27 January], That the clause stand part of the Bill. 
 Question again proposed.

Douglas Alexander: The hon. Member for Ribble Valley (Mr. Evans) suggested in his contribution to the debate that the guidance might require organisations in category 2 to commit considerable resources to the response to emergencies. If I recollect correctly, he suggested the possibility of hiring satellites.
 It would, therefore, be helpful to make the purpose of the guidance clear to the Committee. The guidance is not a mechanism for instructing responders as to what to do in an emergency. It is a means by which we give responders detailed support and information, and advice on how to fulfil their obligations under part 1 of the Bill. In the case of utility companies, the duties are limited to co-operation and information sharing, most of which will take place through the proposed local resilience forums. It is difficult, therefore, to conceive of how that could require substantial investment in new equipment, let alone the hiring of a satellite. 
 The hon. Gentleman also asked when the guidance would become available; he rightly suggested that it would not be fair to allow the obligations included in the Bill to take effect without proper support. The Government agree, and that is why the guidance is already being developed. Indeed, it has been under development with stakeholders since the autumn. 
 The guidance will not be a step change; it will be a codification of existing best practice. It will not simply be imposed on practitioners. We are already committed to consultation on the regulations, following Royal Assent, but before they take effect. That consultation will also include discussion of the content of the guidance. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 - Advice and assistance to business

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Patrick Mercer: I would not seek to divide the Committee on this clause, but I will make one or two points to the Minister. The clause makes provisions for advice and assistance to business in an emergency such as those that we have discussed, whether caused by terrorism or a natural event. I ask
 the Minister to clarify two points for me.
 My first point concerns the Financial Services Authority. Depending on the circumstances, I should have thought that the FSA might already be empowered to take such actions as are specified in the clause. If there are good arguments that the existing FSA powers are inadequate, the FSA should be empowered to take such decisions and actions. That is why it was set up by Parliament. Does it make sense for the FSA to be ridden roughshod over from that point of view? Would it not be better qualified or experienced to deal with the particular problems occurring in that sort of emergency than any other authority or Minister? 
 My second point concerns the indication that we have been given by Project Unicorn. I will enlighten people about that, if I may. I am sure that the hon. Member for Ealing, North (Mr. Pound) will be fascinated to hear the background to it, if he does not know it already. There is no doubt that London business, in general, feels that it is not adequately prepared to deal with an emergency–an emergency caused by terrorism rather than a natural emergency. The criticisms that the Project Unicorn paper made of the Government go long and far. My concern is that the Metropolitan police feel sufficiently undermined and unsupported by Government assistance that they have, off their own bat and off their own budget, commissioned a report, which brings out several serious criticisms of the Government in their support for business, particularly in the London area. May I go over those, just to make sure that the Minster is quite clear? 
 The report identified five significant themes, which have emerged from the work of Project Unicorn. First, is a lack of a co-ordinated and structured Government counter-terrorist communications policy; second, the absence of an identifiable and publicised centre for counter-terrorism in London; third, the potential of the private security industry, as part of a wider police family; fourth, the need for a better understanding of the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat; and, last, the application of corporate governance to counter-terrorism. 
 I could go on, but I will not, as we need to crack on. These are serious criticisms that are being made, not in a party political style, but simply because business, particularly in the Greater London area, feels desperately vulnerable. Despite the work of London Resilience, to which I pay tribute–in the spirit of non-party political points, I do believe that a lot of useful work has gone on inside the London area–this report makes the point that unless a number of fairly simple and pragmatic measures are taken, business will continue to feel extraordinarily vulnerable. There are a number of other points, but, essentially, business in the London area feels that Government must come to its assistance. I do not see how in this clause of the Bill any further assistance is really offered to them. That is all I have to say–Project Unicorn and the affair of the Financial Services Authority make my point quite clearly. What is the Minister's point of view?

Richard Allan: I am curious to get a clear understanding of how this clause will work. If the clause is taken together with the draft regulations that have been published in the regulatory impact assessment, one gets different pictures of what will happen under the clause.
 The regulatory impact assessment suggests–certainly in terms of the costs that business will incur–that, for business, this clause is effectively all about an annual seminar on business continuity management run by the local authority. The local authority says that it will have a seminar, explain the kind of risks that might occur and give advice, and businesses will be expected to attend such a seminar. 
 The draft regulations are not entirely clear. It is mainly the local authorities that we are talking about, but also the emergency services. They have a responsibility whereby they 
''must give advice and assistance to the local members of the public at large''
 and 
''may give advice and assistance to individual local members of the public''–
 I am interested in the distinction between giving advice to local members of the public and individual members of the public–and they 
''may refer local members of public or individual local members of the public to a business continuity consultant.''
 There will be some concerns from business about the role of the responders in this clause, and what role they may have in directing people to business continuity consultants. 
 The draft regulations then go on to offer some transitional provisions, which, effectively, mean that for the first two years local authorities would have no duty to offer advice to small businesses–those defined as having fewer than 250 employees or a balance sheet of less than {**ed**}6 million. In passing, it is interesting to see how much legislation we are now putting forward where we define monetary sums in euros rather than in pounds sterling. It seems as though we are future-proofing legislation–which is not unwelcome to me, but I find curious–with a certain assumption in mind. 
 It is an exemption for the local authority rather than for businesses. We are used to exempting small businesses from regulatory burdens, but my understanding of clause 4 is that it would be entirely voluntary anyway. It is for local businesses to come forward, but the duty is on the local authority rather than the businesses. It is a curious exemption. It is not an exemption to favour local businesses by not giving them a regulatory burden, but to make life a little easier for the responders–the local authorities–in that they can say no to smaller businesses when they would have to say yes to larger businesses. That is my understanding, so I should be grateful if the Minister would confirm that. 
 There is also the question of charging in the regulations produced under the clause. The regulations state: 
''Relevant responders may charge for any advice or assistance provided on request''
 and then limit how charges can be made. Will the Minister confirm that charging will be voluntary and that the duty will be on the local authorities and other responders, not on businesses? As I understand it, businesses are being told not that they must pay for the advice, only that they may be asked for it, and that the local authorities and others will have a duty to provide advice, certainly for larger businesses, and may make a relevant charge. 
 Will the Minister give us a clear understanding of the extent to which he thinks that the provision will be used in practice? We said earlier that we were worried that some part 1 provisions would not be used enough, because they were too complex or insufficiently funded for local authorities and others to get a hold on them. However, on this clause, we are saying that although the aim is laudable–people planning for contingencies should offer business continuity advice–the complexity of how the regulations and clause work together and the fact that the service will be chargeable may mean that the clause's provisions will not be well used in practice.

Douglas Alexander: I shall first endeavour to place in context the remarks of the hon. Members for Newark (Patrick Mercer) and for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan) before turning to the latter's specific questions.
 For context, it is important to put on record that many local authorities already undertake such preparation and work. The merit of local authorities making preparations was made evident not least by the work of local authorities in Manchester following the IRA bomb several years ago. Kirklees metropolitan council is another example of an authority undertaking such work. 
 I should emphasise that the burden is not necessarily onerous. The regulations are likely to require light-touch awareness raising, for example by the circulation of leaflets and giving of seminars. The more burdensome assistance–effective business continuity consultancy–will not be undertaken by all local authorities, and those that do will be able to charge for it. That will be on the basis of a judgment made by businesses on the merits and demerits of the consultancy available. 
 Local authorities will be able to draw on centrally provided material, which will help avoid the duplication of effort. As we have previously discussed at some length, we are committed to ensuring that local responders are properly funded. Any additional funding pressures will be dealt with via the established procedures in the 2004 spending review. 
 The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam asked for guidance on the distinction between ''must'' and ''may''. The regulations provide that each local authority must provide advice and assistance to the public at large. As I suggested, that advice could be in the form of leaflets, poster or mailshots. The regulations provide also that local authorities may in addition give advice and assistance to individual businesses and may refer businesses to a qualified business continuity consultant–someone with qualifications and expertise in business continuity 
 management, for example. Local authorities may provide those additional services, and many already do, but the Government do not propose to impose an obligation. Such advice would be tailored more to the needs of particular businesses in particular circumstances. 
 It was suggested that this part of the Bill might trample on the authority of the Financial Services Agency, but that is not the case. The primary responsibility for civil contingency planning in the financial service sector rests with the private sector, and outstanding examples of business continuity management are already manifested by the private sector. Authorities such as the FSA, the Bank of England and the Treasury have also put in place several measures to promote order in the event of a major operational disruption to the financial system. I am confident that we are striking the right balance between not undermining the FSA, the Bank of England, the Treasury and the particular circumstances of the City of London, and ensuring that we build on the best practice from elsewhere. 
 The hon. Member for Newark made some points about a leaked document on Project Unicorn. He will understand that the Government would prefer to comment on documents when they are published rather than in leaked form–I say that with assurance in the light of this week's events. However, I am certainly aware from my experience of travelling to see Operation Osiris that there is a high level of co-operation between my right hon. Friend the Minister for Local Government, Regional Governance and Fire, the elected Mayor of London and the City of London authorities. I understand that the hon. Gentleman accompanied Ministers on that occasion. I can assure the Committee that a great deal of work takes place to ensure that there are adequate preparations for any civil contingency likely to affect the City of London. 
Several hon. Members rose–

Douglas Alexander: I was about to say that I hoped that I had covered the points raised, but clearly I have not done so.

Patrick Mercer: The Minister mentioned the Osiris exercise, which I was lucky enough to be able to observe. My understanding is that it was more than two years after 11 September before a practical exercise of any sort took place to see what the reaction of the Government and, indeed, London would be to such an incident. That is in addition to the criticisms that I have already made. Does he seriously believe that one single exercise of that type is sufficient to suggest that London's business community is prepared for such an event?

Douglas Alexander: Operation Osiris, which I recollect took place in September, was only the latest in a number of exercises that the Government have undertaken. It is important at this stage in the Committee's deliberations to address a misperception that may be creeping into some of the analysis being offered on the Bill. It is important to recognise that the Bill is designed to update the framework of civil
 protection in this country. I can assure the Committee that, quite apart from the need to modernise the legislative framework, a whole strain of work has been taken forward to strengthen the resilience capabilities not only of the Government, but of the emergency services in the wider sense. That is why, in the previous Budget, there was an allocation of, if I recollect correctly, about £300 million across a range of Departments to fight terrorism. That was for local responders and to fund counter-terrorism work.
 It would be wholly wrong to suggest that the time scale for legislative change was not preceded by a range of other work. That work has been taken forward principally by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, but also by a range of other Departments. Operation Osiris formed only one part of a wide range of work that has been taken forward in relation not only to London, but to civil contingency planning across the UK more generally. If the hon. Gentleman would care to look back at the record of our previous deliberations, he will see that I referred to some of the exercises that the Government have undertaken since 11 September.

Richard Allan: Before the Minister finishes speaking, could he deal with the transitional arrangements as set out in the regulations, particularly in respect of small businesses, and the clause 4(1) duty that will be laid on local authorities? I should like to be assured that I have understood precisely how the exemption is intended to work.

Douglas Alexander: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive my oversight in not addressing that point. The Government are considering whether it is appropriate to make transitional provision in relation to the business continuity management promotion duty. That would allow local authorities more time to build up their expertise in that area. There are some examples–Manchester and Kirklees come to mind–of authorities that do an outstanding job at the moment, but in some other authorities, capacity will need to be developed, and we are giving thought to that.
 The draft regulations include a provision that would limit the business continuity promotion duty to businesses of a certain size. More thought is being given to how we ensure that we get the fit right between the need to ensure that that work is undertaken more widely by local authorities than is currently the case, and recognising where those local authorities are starting from. I am sure that we will be able to do that in the course of the discussions. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 - General measures

Patrick Mercer: I beg to move amendment No. 34, in
clause 5, page 5, line 40, at end insert– 
 '(d) establishing an emergency volunteer reserve force'.
 I was interested to hear the Minister's view that the Bill is designed to update the framework of civil 
 defence throughout the nation–or words to that effect. I believe that I have got the quote right; if not, he will forgive me. As I see it, the Bill is designed to put in place a series of regulations and legislation that will empower local and, indeed, national authorities to deal with the problem. At one end of the spectrum there is the problem; at the other, the legislation. I contend that the vital link between the two is missing. There should be something wholly more credible and useful than what we have now that will allow the legislation to be put into practice. Without a work force to supplement the blue light services and other parts of the national framework, the problems will go unaddressed. 
 It is interesting to see what the Government have created so far to assist the blue light and other emergency services. Currently, in any region, in the event of an emergency such as those that we are debating, we would expect the ambulance service, the fire service, and the NHS with all its attendant parts, to respond to such an incident. Under chapter 4 of the strategic defence review, the Government have established a force that they refer to as the civil contingencies reaction force. The CCRF is intended to provide a series, largely of Army, but also of Royal Navy, Royal Marine and Royal Air Force volunteers, who are already serving members of the Territorial Army or the other reserve forces. When those soldiers, sailors and airmen have volunteered for the CCRF, they focus specifically on helping the emergency services throughout the region. 
 It is no coincidence that the CCRF has found itself extremely stretched in terms of declaring itself operationally ready. Just before the Bill's Second Reading–strange to relate–the Government said that the force was ready. However, the facts are rather less than the theory. There are supposed to be 7,000 CCRF volunteers under arms at the moment, but so far the Government have only 5,000 who are physically accredited as part of the CCRF. There is a further problem: the fact that any volunteer, of whatever colour of uniform, tends to be a recidivist–a serial volunteer. It will therefore come as no surprise to the Minister that three-quarters of the people who form two of the best civil contingency reaction forces–under the cap badge of the London regiment–have volunteered for service in Iraq. If the London CCRF were called now, we should find them somewhere outside Basra. My facts may not be quite correct, but it seems likely that the very sad death of a private soldier from the Royal Rifle Volunteers outside Kabul last night was exacerbated by the fact that he was also a member of his local CCRF. If a work force is established to help, it must be effective. Currently, the very slight measures that the Government have taken to assist and to create something additional, are utterly inadequate. 
 I should also like to mention the views of the British Red Cross. It talks about volunteering, in both theory and practice, across the board. It says that there should be a formal, explicit recognition of the contribution of the voluntary sector as key providers 
 of the humanitarian aspects of emergency planning and response. It goes on to say that a duty should be placed upon statutory authorities to involve the voluntary sector in emergency planning and response, and that an acknowledgment of the voluntary sector's contribution would formalise an already active response. What concerns me about the Bill is that there is no new thinking; no new initiatives have been taken to give it more muscle when it is enacted. I may be guilty of wagging a wholly inappropriate finger at the Government, but there has never been any difficulty with the creation of voluntary or part-time organisations. The British Government did so at least three or four times in the 20th century. Voluntary organisations were established during the first world war to deal with the threat of bombing. From as early as 1935, air raid precautions and other voluntary organisations were established to ensure that when–not if–an emergency occurred there would be bodies on the ground to assist. 
 Precisely the same thing happened during the cold war. Sadly the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) is not present, but he held a position in the civil defence organisation during the cold war. Similarly, during the IRA emergency, voluntary bodies were put in place in Northern Ireland to assist in detecting terrorism and warning the police. 
 Some of the ideas put forward by the foremost thinkers on homeland security or civil defence, whatever we call it, should be aired. The Government should prove that they have carefully considered establishing, for want of a better phrase, an emergency volunteer reserve. I may be wrong, but I imagine that the hon. Member for Ealing, North is about to intervene and make a comment about ''Dad's Army''. The idea conjured up is of a body of elderly men and women in uniform, but we should not think like that. 
 We should borrow ideas from people such as David Veness, Major General Peter Curry and other foremost thinkers on such problems. We should put in place volunteer doctors, paramedics, hazardous material trained HGV drivers, and other crucial members of the community who, in an emergency, could be mobilised to help at the scene of an incident. I have been criticised, strange as that may sound, for making expensive suggestions, but this scheme does not need to be expensive. It should be viewed in the same way as the American army corps of engineers. They are civilians who might put on a uniform or an arm band during an emergency and physically stand to. 
 Let us assume that a dirty bomb explodes in Liverpool.

Stephen Pound: No-one would notice.

Patrick Mercer: The fact that the hon. Gentleman could suggest that Liverpudlians would not notice is appalling and scurrilous. I do not associate myself with such a comment about Merseyside where I spent many happy years as a boy. [Interruption.] I was neither
 jousting nor indulging in any other form of chivalric activity. If a dirty bomb did explode, I believe that the emergency services, perhaps with the assistance of the civil contingencies reaction force or regular forces, would be able to contain the problem for no more than 36 hours. They could establish a cordon and set up hospitals and decontamination points, but other factors, such as the wind or the style of the device, could prolong the threat.
 In the event of such an incident, there should be a force that could be brought from perhaps Ealing, North and taken to Liverpool. Those doctors, paramedics, water workers and drivers could be in place not only to assist the police and other blue light services, but to take over from emergency workers exhausted by the style and scale of the emergency. There is nothing revolutionary in that and it would not be expensive. The British public would wholeheartedly seize upon the idea and volunteers would be forthcoming. I will not guess at a size or price of such an emergency volunteer reserve. I want fresh and innovative thinking from the Government. 
 I also question deeply the Government's use of the regular armed forces to help in such circumstances. If we were to go outside now and ask how many nuclear, biological and chemical warfare-trained regular servicemen there are in this country, I could be wrong but I guess that there would be about 60,000 hands in the air. That work force is completely untapped. There is no contingency or forward planning to involve the regular forces in the assistance of the country in emergency incidents. Powers certainly exist for them to be mobilised at short notice. In the event of a CBRN-type incident in Westminster, we would depend on the Metropolitan fire brigades to provide not just fire but decontamination assistance. Their resources are limited, but there are men and women trained to help in those circumstances. 
 I shall give an example. During the firemen's strike, a battalion of regular infantry was brought down and placed in Wellington barracks to assist with problems here in the event of a fire, and there were breathing apparatus teams with them. It struck me that the arrival of 600-odd soldiers in this area meant that we would suddenly have on hand a highly trained work force that, in the event of a dirty bomb or something similar, would be instantly available to give well-trained, well-organised and well-equipped advice on how to deal with it. On questioning that regiment, it transpired that they had not brought any equipment with them; no orders had been given with regard to a CBRN-type attack, nor had that been mentioned. That illustrates the fact that the Government's thinking on the subject is extremely sparse. Can the Minister, therefore, tell the Committee how the Government intend physically to implement the Bill on the ground? Without some muscle behind it in addition to those attempts that have already been made, the Bill is likely to become a paper tiger.

Richard Allan: I am interested in the amendment, introduced by the hon. Member for Newark in such a chivalrous fashion, but I am not sure that we can
 support it. There is scope for a lot of people to engage in an activity under subsection (1)(b) of clause 5 for the purpose of
''reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency''.
 I agree with him wholeheartedly that volunteers will play a significant part in that. In our discussions in the Special Standing Committee, we had representations from volunteer organisations, and the British Red Cross made very effective points about the way in which it had been engaged in mitigating the effects of emergencies over many years in the United Kingdom. Its members are often the unsung heroes. I am not entirely convinced of the merits of introducing a new structure to deal with that. We have structures in place already. 
 The British Red Cross is functioning well and there are bodies such as the St. John Ambulance. The hon. Gentleman correctly referred to the position of volunteer medical staff; I am aware of that because a lot of medics living in Sheffield already volunteer for the Territorial Army. When the TA needs medical staff, they will be called up from within my constituency and, I know, many other constituencies up and down the land. However, I am not convinced that there is any spare capacity; in other words, my instinct is that everybody who wishes to volunteer already volunteers. I am not sure that we would get any new resources by setting up an extra force that would appear to be in competition with what already exists. We must co-ordinate the existing bodies, and I hope that there will be a clear duty on category 1 responders. We recommended to the Special Standing Committee that we should like to see the duty on the category 1 responders to the existing bodies more explicitly spelled out. The Government responded in the negative because they felt that there were different views among the voluntary sector organisations. However, there was probably consensus about the leading voluntary organisations, especially the TA. The TA is an extra resource that can be, and is, called up for military activity abroad. I assume that it would be used as a major port of call for any emergency activity that took place in the UK. All those bodies should be enmeshed in the emergency planning process, and I am not persuaded that an additional body would be the way to achieve that aim.

Patrick Mercer: I accept the points that the hon. Gentleman makes. The point that I was trying to make–I obviously did not make it clearly enough–is that an emergency volunteer reserve, if that is what we are to call them, must have some special form of training. I accept the points made by the hon. Gentleman about the voluntary organisations, including the TA, but I fear that the sort of specialist training needed for dealing, for instance, with contamination problems, will not be provided. The Red Cross–God bless it–at present has no training in dealing with such problems. Therefore, although such voluntary organisations would have some utility, my argument is that their use would not be a complete solution.

Richard Allan: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. There is a question about the extent to which all those organisations provide training for
 the more extreme kinds of emergencies that are covered by the Bill rather than for their normal activities. However, I am keen to see a healthy voluntary sector that is regularly used–as happens at present. Organisations such as the St. John Ambulance, the Red Cross, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, and many others that deal with different sectoral interests, carry out their business week in, week out. Those organisations will be ready, alert and willing to engage, although they might require additional training for a more severe emergency.
 If the suggestion is that a separate force should be set up, my concern is that that force would never be used except in those most extreme circumstances. In other words, it would be sitting there unused, waiting for months or years until such an emergency happened. It would be better to focus on the provisions that require category 1 responders to reduce, control or mitigate the effects of the emergency, and to examine ways in which the relationships between the category 1 responders and the existing voluntary sector organisations or the TA could be meshed into that. I fully accept the hon. Gentleman's point about training. However, that is not a sufficient argument for setting up an entirely different structure, so we cannot support the amendment.

John Butterfill: Order. I remind hon. Members that it is not permissible to bring refreshments into the Committee. Although the new sitting hours may mean that some hon. Members are still feeling hungry, having had an early lunch, I should be grateful if they would refrain from consuming refreshments in the Committee.

Stephen Pound: If that comment referred to the fact that I am currently masticating, I should say that it is on nicotine chewing gum, which is more medicinal than pleasurable. I apologise if I gave the impression of consumption, or even enjoyment.
 I shall respond to the points made by the hon. Member for Newark, henceforth to be known as the blue knight of Newark. Other hon. Members have commented on the gentlemanly and chivalrous way in which he made his points, and I, too, appreciate that. However, I will make two points in response. First, the hon. Gentleman rather betrays the military mindset–albeit from a rather more junior branch of the service. There are 42,800 men and women in the armed forces trained in the three categories to which he referred–the men and women in the Royal Navy. The hon. Gentleman did not mention them, but they are all trained and many of them performed sterling work in the recent fire dispute. 
 Secondly, I have–sadly–had some experience of this type of disaster, because some years ago there was a huge Real IRA bomb in Ealing. Having lived most of my life in the shadow of NATO Strike Command in Northwood, I had long anticipated what would happen if there was a disaster. As mayor of Ealing, I was privy to the London borough of Ealing's civil contingencies. Fortunately, we declared the borough a 
 nuclear-free zone, and there was not one nuclear attack on the London borough of Ealing–the Tupolevs and the Ilyushins thundered overhead and did not pause. In fact, most of our civil contingency seemed to be built around the identification of mass grave sites. 
 If we have a disaster on the scale envisaged by the hon. Gentleman, it could go two ways. Either the whole city will collapse and only a few people will survive, or there will be many injured civilians, civil disorder and the need to respond in the same way as we responded to the bombs in Ealing. Oddly enough, in the latter case, the need is not for highly skilled men and women trained in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, but for people to do the basic things such as those done by the scouts and guides, the Women's Royal Voluntary Service, the St. John Ambulance and the Red Cross: sweep up glass, take children out of houses, find temporary accommodation and keep the streets clear. Providing that support is essential, and if we tried to create a command structure filled with people trained to the highest level, we would lose sight of the need for a different but equally important level of support on the ground.

Jim Dowd: I just wanted my hon. Friend's assurance on the success of Ealing's anti-nuclear policy. When the Tupolevs and Ilyushins went past at 30,000 ft, is he convinced that the pilots did not look down at Ealing and think that it had already been bombed?

Stephen Pound: Only a bounder from south of the river would make such a comment. I am already bitterly regretting the slur that I passed on the proud city of Liverpool, which I withdraw unreservedly. I register my admiration for that noble metropolis.
Mr. Allan rose–

Stephen Pound: I give way to the hon. Gentleman, who comes from an equally noble metropolis.

Richard Allan: The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the Liberal Democrats now control Liverpool city council. His comment was most helpful to my colleagues there, and I will ensure that they receive not only the original comment, but his withdrawal.

Stephen Pound: A Liberal Democrat council is not necessarily a reason for a nuclear attack, but the idea has much to commend it.
 To return to the point, a command structure already exists, and to duplicate it seems to go against everything that those of us who have a residual affection for the Conservative party hoped that it believed in–a removal of bureaucracy and a cutting away of the tiers of apparatchiks. However, the hon. Member for Newark seems to be proposing a system in which someone who wants to help on the day will have to go to a particular command centre or regional commander. 
 I remember receiving the phone call about the bomb in Ealing at 20 past 1 in the morning and going down to Ealing broadway to see the streets littered with glass, fire alarms going off and people milling around aimlessly. The people who wanted to help did so. They did not have to phone or write to someone or 
 work out where they fitted in the master plan; they merely came and helped. The official structure was in place, with the police as the primary commanders in conjunction with the other emergency services, and if people wanted to help, they could.

Nigel Evans: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Stephen Pound: I may regret it, but I will give way.

Nigel Evans: Of course the hon. Gentleman will regret it.
 The hon. Gentleman mentioned one incident that happened in Ealing, which we all remember chillingly. It was an awful thing to happen, but it was limited in its nature, and we are considering all eventualities, which might include a dirty bomb or a smallpox outbreak in which specialist skills are needed, which some people, in the Red Cross, for example, have. Is it not right that they should be brought in at an early stage, even at the point of planning, to make suggestions? To prevent a terrorist attack, Ealing, North could clearly declare itself a smallpox or emergency-free zone. If the council puts up a few signs, Ealing will be all right, but what about the rest of the country?

Stephen Pound: We have been free of the pox for many years, largely because of our clean-limbed and healthy lifestyle, which we might export to Ribble Valley if necessary. However, the hon. Gentleman made precisely my point. I agree with him on the generality, and the Bill provides precisely the structure, inclusion and process of training to which he referred. I find myself in the unusual position of entirely supporting the Government. The Minister looks horrified, but I should say that the last time I voted against the Government was over foundation hospitals and they put me on the Standing Committee that considered the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Bill. Since then I have never voted against them.
 There is always a balance to be struck between the skilled, trained, professional, permanent forces and the skilled, trained, amateur, volunteer sector–I do not use the word amateur in a derogatory sense, merely in the sense of remuneration. I think that the balance is right, so I reluctantly argue against the amendment of the hon. Member for Newark. We have a template, structure or format that meets the various needs that have been discussed. It respects individuals who contribute, without establishing the stultifying smothering layer of bureaucracy that every Conservative election manifesto that I have refers to.

Michael Trend: We have heard that the Special Standing Committee thought it a good idea to place a statutory duty on category 1 responders to consult with and involve relevant voluntary organisations on civil contingency planning. Why have the Government not done so? We have also heard that the Red Cross offers emotional and practical support in emergencies, and the hon. Member for Ealing, North talked about a tragedy at Ealing broadway.
 I shall discuss civil contingency in a more specific context than that of volunteers in general. My constituency contains a section of the River Thames, which flooded badly in the new year of 2003. The Environment Agency is a category 1 responder responsible for that section of the river. Many homes were flooded during the emergency, and numerous organisations were involved, including the Environment Agency, the local authority and the police. However, a system of volunteers emerged with people looking after their own and neighbours' properties for worthy and altruistic reasons. Elderly people were moved because their neighbours knew that they were likely to be in distress, and sandbags were delivered. 
 After the flooding many questions were asked, mostly of the Environment Agency. In my opinion, the Environment Agency had an institutional prejudice against volunteers. It said that there had been a voluntary warden system but that it had long been in disrepair. It used that as evidence that the system did not work and that voluntary systems could not be relied on for help. I took the opposite view–that the voluntary warden system had fallen into disrepair because nobody had taken an avuncular interest; it was nobody's responsibility to update it or ensure that posts were filled. I do not see a problem in sending a strong signal that large state or para-state bodies should be responsible for ensuring that the efforts of willing people, who know an area and know what to do in an emergency, should be channelled in an organised and regular way. 
 It is better that people are organised in an emergency rather than being left to organise themselves. I imagine a vigilante group of volunteers running around doing what they think might be best, but which might not be in the general scheme of things. One cannot stop them doing that, so they should have some sort of help. I am sure that the Government are in favour of the principle of volunteers. In some emergencies, such as the flood in my constituency, volunteers can be useful and will make themselves available. Surely, therefore, it is better to find some way of directing their energies and to include in the Bill some sort of strong guidance for organisations such as the Environment Agency that may need a culture change to be able to use this source of voluntary labour and enthusiasm when emergencies arise?

Douglas Alexander: First, may I express my pleasant surprise at the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North and the hon. Member for Windsor (Mr. Trend)? It was intriguing and then deeply worrying; so effective were my hon. Friend's comments from the Back Benches that I feared for my position on the Front Bench as his contribution continued.
 On a more serious note, I extend my sympathy to the constituents of the hon. Member for Windsor who suffered in the flooding that he described, as I am sure would all hon. Members. My constituency has also suffered from flooding in recent years, and I know how devastating it can be to the lives of families in many communities. He asked me about the Government's 
 response to the voluntary sector, particularly to the request for a statutory duty to be placed on the category 1 responders. It is worth once again going over the specific point that we addressed in the response to the considerations of the Joint Committee. 
 The Government place a high value on the role that the voluntary sector plays in the response to emergencies. Voluntary organisations have a great deal of involvement in multi-agency planning and response. However, we anticipate that their contribution will continue on a voluntary rather than a statutory basis, because there is disagreement in the voluntary sector about what its status should be and, in any event, it is doubtful whether voluntary organisations could sustain a statutory obligation consistently in all parts of the country and for the foreseeable future. 
 Throughout the consultation period, the major national voluntary organisations expressed mixed views on their inclusion, and we do not want to impose an unrealistic and unwanted obligation on them. The status of voluntary organisations do not have the same level of certainty of resources or legal framework that public sector bodies have, so it is unrealistic to place a duty on them. There are often differences between the national and local levels, as some organisations are local or regional in nature. Again, it is important to draw the Committee's attention to the Government's response to the Joint Committee's report, in which we state that 
''We fully endorse Category 1 responders seeking advice from organisations they believe could be of assistance to them. Though not specifically detailed, there are no impediments to this type of relationship within the Bill. We consider that details of this policy are best placed in the guidance and not on the face of the Bill.''
 In response to the hon. Gentleman's query about the Environment Agency, I am confident that the framework that is established that brings together category 1 responders and that discusses collaboratively the challenges that a local community faces could effect exactly the sort of cultural change that he seeks. However, the Government's case in response to the Joint Committee is compelling. The two voluntary organisations that we have probably heard the most about this afternoon are the St. John Ambulance and the British Red Cross. As I recollect, they had fundamentally divergent views on whether there should be a statutory duty on category 1 responders and whether they should be included in the categories.

Michael Trend: I am encouraged by what the Minister said. If he has any influence in this matter, I ask him to encourage the Environment Agency to examine its cultural preconceptions about this issue.

Douglas Alexander: I am happy to ensure that the hon. Gentleman's remarks are brought to the attention of the Environment Agency. We can explore whether that should be through me or by ministerial correspondence through DEFRA, but I undertake to write to him to let him know that his remarks have been passed on.
 The hon. Member for Ribble Valley, who is not in his seat, raised queries about the Red Cross. It is important to try to address specific issues, and two examples suffice. At the Potters Bar train crash, British Red Cross ambulances were deployed to undertake routine work, which freed the statutory ambulance service to concentrate on the incident. At the Ladbroke Grove train crash, the British Red Cross provided a befriending service to victims and relatives, and provided ambulances to support the statutory services. Indeed, I take this opportunity to place on record the gratitude of all members of the Committee for the work of the Red Cross and other voluntary organisations in dealing with major incidents. 
 I fear that the hon. Member for Newark strayed close to suggesting that the British Red Cross has no involvement in the preparations that are under way for major incidents. Although I accept part of the point that he made, it is important to recognise that all major voluntary organisations have enhanced their training in that area since 11 September and have been co-operating fully with the Government. For that, we are grateful. 
 The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam and my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North cut to the chase when it came to identifying the central issue. If there is common ground on the importance of the voluntary sector, there is fundamental disagreement across the Committee on the best means of harnessing that voluntary activity. 
 It is fair to say that the Government remain unconvinced by the case that has again been articulated this afternoon for an emergency volunteer reserve force taking the place of the many voluntary organisations that do such sterling work for the people of Britain and have done so over a number of years. It is no coincidence that that case is advanced by a party that has, in a separate guise, argued for a department of homeland security, rather than recognising the distinctive character of the British constitution and Cabinet system. 
 The idea of seeking to bring together in a brigade all the voluntary effort that would go towards dealing with civil contingencies such as we are discussing under the Bill ignores the reality of part of the motivation for volunteers joining organisations and comes close to failing to recognise the serious contribution that those organisations make. 
 To take one example, the suggestion that national health service staff would need to be part of an emergency volunteer reserve force in order to offer the necessary level of support to colleagues facing a major catastrophe is dangerously wide of the mark and does not reflect the reality of how the health service works. As someone whose mother has served in the health service for more than 30 years and someone who grew up in a village in the west of Scotland and well remembers the incident at Lockerbie, I do not think that there can be any question but that the dedicated public servants who staff the national health service would, without a second thought and regardless of whether they were part of an emergency volunteer force, ensure that they provided the help necessary to 
 support the range of services that are provided at the moment. 
 The hon. Member for Newark advanced a particular case on the role of the civil contingency reaction force. It is important to recognise that the contribution of the CCRF is only one of the response capabilities that the armed forces could provide in an emergency. As we have heard, the contribution of the regular armed forces during the foot and mouth outbreak and the firefighters' dispute is evidence of the fact that other contributions are available.

Patrick Mercer: Can the Minister illuminate how much contingency planning by the regular forces had gone on in order to help with the foot and mouth crisis and, when the crisis occurred, how long it took to call the regular forces and how long it took them to go into action? I ask that simply because I contend that no contingency planning had gone on at all.

Douglas Alexander: There is clearly provision to allow for the armed forces to be deployed. The hon. Gentleman need not take my word for it; he need only consider the evidence from the foot and mouth outbreak and other incidents that we have encountered in the past. The nature of a contingency sometimes defies immediate planning and preparation, but I should have thought that the hon. Gentleman would have been well aware from his own distinguished service that the British armed forces are without peer and have great capability and expertise. That was brought to bear on, for example, foot and mouth. It means that they are uniquely equipped to work alongside the emergency or blue light services–to which he paid tribute–in an incident.
 However, it is important to maintain perspective at this juncture on the appropriate roles of the emergency services and the armed forces. Although the British armed forces have given great service in civil contingencies in the past, their responsibility has principally been to support the emergency services. Once again, that makes the case for the Bill that the Government are advancing. To ensure that there is the appropriate codification and clarification of the respective role of local authorities and other category 1 responders is in no way to diminish the contribution that our armed forces could make in particular circumstances.

Stephen Pound: I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, and I assure him that I have no designs on his elevated position. The point on the armed forces, and the fact that in a highly personal and confidential letter that I received today from the hon. Member for Ribble Valley I noticed at the bottom of his notepaper he has the sign ''Supporting our armed services'', featuring the Union flag and the stars and stripes–which is slightly unusual, but not something I wish to comment on–leads me to ask about those forces of another power that happen to be stationed permanently or on rotation in the United Kingdom? What happens to them? There is a wealth of expertise here, which does not necessarily have to be marked by having the flag of a foreign nation on a piece of House of Commons notepaper. Would they be brought into this process?

Douglas Alexander: As ever, my hon. Friend raises a telling and searching point, which, had he provided me notice, I could have answered in a more comprehensive fashion. I am glad to say that the line to take has just been passed to me–those forces would help on a case-by-case basis. What sterling service from the Rolls-Royce machine that is the British civil service.
 The point merits a serious answer. We would have a clear expectation that the humanitarian support provided by British forces overseas would be reciprocated. That applies not simply to work done by the emergency services, but, for example, to the recent work carried out by UK search and rescue teams in the Iranian city of Bam. It is clear that there is a high level of co-operation, and in that sense the point is well taken. We could look with confidence to our strategic partners in supporting us, if such circumstances arose.

Patrick Mercer: I am most grateful for the opportunity to comment. Coming back to the lack of innovative and fresh thinking, it can be no better exemplified than by the hon. Member for Ealing, North, with a little bit of fresh and innovative thinking, suddenly bowling a quick one there to the Minister. What, for instance, will be done with the considerable number of American forces stationed inside this country? I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for, almost, coming on his steed to rescue a damsel in distress with this particular suggestion. How very nice that here is a precise example of an area about which the Government simply has not thought.
 The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam, whose comments crossed over with those of the hon. Member for Ealing, North, pointed out that, whatever exists at the moment, there is not the training or the specialisation in the voluntary sector to deal with the extreme emergency, precisely the sort of conditions that this Bill is designed to address. Not for one moment should the Minister misunderstand me–I fully understand the contribution of the voluntary sector. I sat on the Joint Committee and heard many representations from extraordinarily well motivated, dedicated, hard-working, honest, loyal and decent patriots, who are willing to come forward, and indeed do come forward, for voluntary work, and to which I pay tribute. The fact remains that, while they can certainly sweep up glass, remove trees that have been knocked down and, at a pinch, help people out of crashed vehicles, they cannot deal with chemical decontamination, for example. 
 I am surprised by the hon. Member for Ealing, North's comments about bureaucracy, because the Government thought it wise to establish a whole new form of bureaucracy, in the shape of the civil contingency reaction force. I must make sure that the hon. Gentleman understands that, with a whole new tier of brigade and divisional responsibility among the armed forces, the CCRFs are all about bureaucracy–about many figures and not much ability to react. 
 I take issue with him that I made no mention of the senior service. Unless his advanced age has managed to make his ears less effective, I did mention the senior service on at least two occasions–and, of course, I would pay tribute to them being without doubt the guiding light in this particular style of emergency. 
 I will summarise with the comments of the Minister, and I may be paraphrasing. He has already said that it is doubtful that a voluntary organisation could sustain a statutory regulation for any period of time. That is exactly the point–the emergency volunteer reserve must be formed to reinforce existing organisations, but there should be no extra bureaucracy and little expense. The powers laid down in the Bill could be easily adapted to allow these people to take the field to replace exhausted surgeons, drivers and policemen.

Oliver Heald: Will my hon. Friend tell the Committee where the idea came from?

Patrick Mercer: It has come from the minds and lips of some very eminent thinkers on the subject. They include, not least, one of London's police commissioners, David Veness, and one of the foremost thinkers on civil contingencies, Major General Peter Curry. They have had huge experience in such situations.
 I am not content with the Minister's arguments, and I shall express that by not withdrawing the amendment. Should the vote not go our way, we shall return to the point on Report. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:–
The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

John Butterfill: I should tell the Committee that the Clerk is impeded in taking the votes if hon. Members indulge in jocularity and conversation during a Division, and I should be grateful if they would resist that temptation in future.
 On a personal note, may I also say how pleased I was during the discussion of inundation in Windsor and Paisley, South to see the temporary and minor inundation of the papers of the hon. Member for Newark treated through voluntary action by the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire. That was splendid, but the Badge Messenger may be able to get a cloth to mop things up in future.

Oliver Heald: On a point of order, Sir John. Before my hon. Friend the Member for Newark moves amendment No. 35, may I refer to column 4 of the report of our first sitting? In paying tribute to the
 Government Whip, I am reported to have said that he was
''extremely reasonable, accommodating and co-operative, as he always is''–[Official Report, Standing Committee F, 27 January 2004; c. 4.]
 For the avoidance of doubt, I would like to make it clear that I never had any doubt that the Government Whip was a lady and that the record should have read ''she''.

John Butterfill: I will ensure that that matter is brought to the attention of Hansard, and that an appropriate correction is made.

Patrick Mercer: I beg to move amendment No. 35, in
clause 5, page 5, line 40, at end insert– 
 '(e) establishing a public information programme in respect of emergencies'.

John Butterfill: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 36, in
clause 5, page 5, line 40, at end insert– 
 '(f) establishing and promoting a public training programme in respect of emergencies'.

Patrick Mercer: Aspects of the two amendments overlap, and that is why they have been grouped for debate. I hope that the Chairman will take a tolerant view if the arguments overlap and interlock with each other.
 My concerns about the lack of provision for public information in the Bill go hand in hand with the issues discussed under amendment No. 34. There is no emergency volunteer reserve. So much of the fear, drama, difficulty and worry that those sort of threats-–including new sorts of threats–bring to a largely untrained and inexperienced population could be overcome by a more vibrant, thoughtful and better designed campaign for public information. 
 I will give an example that my mother told me about. As a 12-year-old girl in north-east Lincolnshire, she was informed that it seemed likely that an enemy would deploy ''weapons of mass destruction'' in the British Isles in the near future, though that specific phrase was not used. She was told that it was highly likely that the country would go to war with Nazi Germany, and that if that happened the enemy would use two new types of weapons: fleets of aircraft with high explosive bombs, possibly on the Hull docks, which would effect the area where she lived, and poison gas, a weapon of mass destruction of its time. 
 It is interesting to consider how the Government of the day reacted to that news. Using a systematic approach to public information, everybody was told that neither of those threats was insuperable. In the case of the gas threat, they were helped by the fact that there was a generation of men around who had experienced the use of poison gas in the first world war. My grandfather was a victim of gassing in the Ypres salient in 1916. There were people who could say, ''Look, if they use gas, do not be afraid of it. This is how we can handle it.'' 
 The Government of the day chose to take other measures that were innovative and thoughtful. For instance, red pillar boxes–so familiar in every town 
 and village in the UK–were painted in a colour that would, in theory, change in the presence of gas. Bright red pillar boxes were painted grey. The theory was that they would change to green in the presence of gas. That was never going to work, but it made everybody aware that there was a new threat. Every time people went to post a letter, they would think, ''By golly, something is different here. Something has changed. We have a new threat''. That was a highly subtle and effective manner of spreading public information. The Government tell us that spreading that sort of information, concern and knowledge will lead people to panic even more than they have already. 
 I shall quote again from Project Unicorn. The report states: 
''To the public at large the CBRN threat is undoubtedly the most frightening aspect of the 'new terrorism' . . . The Commercial Sector appears to be unanimous in its criticism of the present counter-terrorism Communications Policy prior to a major incident: they find it outdated, condescending, generally uncoordinated and at times, incoherent. Much of this criticism stems from the perceived lack of a central focus for counter-terrorism in government, which is accentuated by the belief that Government does not always understand the commercial implications of counter-terrorism.''
 As we have heard, that report was commissioned for the Metropolitan police, and shows Project Unicorn's view of the lack of information being put across to the public by bodies that should know better. 
 The Society of Industrial Emergency Services Officers states: 
''The experience of SIESO members in warning and informing the public of the potential dangers of living next to top tier COMAH sites gives the lie to the Government's belief that pre-education of the general population will cause panic. There is a need for people to know what measures they can take to safeguard themselves prior to the arrival of professional help. Even then, it will take time for the emergency services to assess the scenario, formulate a response and establish means of indicating to the victims what actions they should take. Neglecting to involve the public prior to an incident, and expecting to be able to inform people after the incident has occurred, is contrary to all best practice of emergency preparedness; it will inevitably be too little, too late.''
 We hear that such a campaign would be very expensive. However, the Government are perfectly happy to be involved in campaigns such as the anti-smoking campaign, and so they should be. An extraordinarily effective campaign of public information is being mounted at the moment, with disgusting scenes of fat being squeezed from people's veins and the like. It is extremely persuasive.

Oliver Heald: The hon. Member for Ealing, North is giving up.

Patrick Mercer: That was, I fear, a cruel intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire.
 Why cannot the Government address themselves to making a much clearer point than they have already? The only information and advice from the Government of which I am aware–perhaps the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, although I am straying on to amendment No. 36–is to go in, stay in and tune in. That seems to be the only existing form of public information.

John Butterfill: Order. Since we are debating amendments Nos. 35 and 36 together, it is perfectly in order for the hon. Gentleman to deal with them both at the same time.

Patrick Mercer: I am most grateful for your advice, Sir John, and I shall try to be more skilful.
 On top of all that I have said, there is the fact that the Government are perfectly happy to mount a public information campaign about working families tax credit. Television is currently inundated with very effective means of informing poorer families how they can get their hands on more money. Is not it entirely proper that a similar campaign should be mounted, in precisely the same way as in the 1950s during the cold war, in the event of weapons of mass destruction–I return to that phrase–being used against an unprotected and unprepared civil population? 
 It is important to understand that the generation that had been victims of weapons of mass destruction, who helped to inform my parents' generation, are generally not around any longer. If, therefore, we are to be ready before–not during–an incident, the Government must make these points clear. There is also the issue of pre-training before an incident occurs. We have already trespassed on that particular ground during the debate on an emergency volunteer reserve, and the need for it to be trained. How much thought have the Government given to wholly new methods of training the public, such as virtual reality training? This can be done quickly, easily and reasonably cheaply. It would be possible, in various different centres, including cinemas around the country, to use virtual reality training to train the public. Voluntary organisations, such as the police force and the fire service, already do a certain amount of this training, but I wonder whether the Government initiative relies on taking, for instance, the Red Cross and using virtual reality to bring them up to scratch on subjects such as decontamination. 
 One of the criticisms levelled against the idea of training the public before an incident is that this will somehow cause fear. May I stray, Sir John, into what was done in Northern Ireland during the IRA's campaign of the 1970s to the 1990s? There it was recognised that the vast majority of the public had absolutely no sympathy, quite rightly, with any form of terrorism that was likely to be perpetrated within the Province, and indeed that the public was going to be one of the security forces' most valuable assets. Not only were there frequent public information campaigns, but also terrorism awareness lessons were given in schools and in other public meeting places and to other public bodies. 
 As a result the public became aware, for instance, that every year at Christmas and Easter republican terrorists were likely to mount campaigns, which indeed they did. It therefore became embedded in the public understanding that these two particular times of year were extremely dangerous. Hand in hand with that went a thorough understanding of terrorist techniques. For instance, every Christmas in the centre of Belfast there was a firebomb campaign; sometimes it was successful, sometimes not. Before Christmas there were public information campaigns to 
 ensure that any shopper who bought a coat or a jacket immediately inspected their purchase to see if there was a cassette bomb in one of the pockets. There was an additional incentive of financial reward for discovering these types of devices. 
 The public were told that the vehicle that the terrorists favoured was the Hiace van, so the public came to understand that Hiaces were therefore suspicious and they came to look at any Hiace lying low on its axle as perhaps containing a mortar or a bomb of considerable weight. As a consequence the public were made aware and were trained, and became part of the wider security family. Terrorism was made additionally difficult for our enemies to perpetrate. 
 The only form of training that has gone on so far for the current style of emergency is the phrase I have already used: ''Go in, stay in and tune in''. That is both public information and training. To be honest, I wonder if it is correct. If one is walking on the Embankment, say, when a dirty bomb goes off, and one perceives oneself to have been contaminated, is that the correct advice? Should one go in and stay in? Absolutely not: it is wholly wrong to follow this advice. Someone who believes that they have been contaminated must stay precisely where they are and so make themselves less of a threat to the rest of the population. 
 If the Government are serious about this issue, not only will they make people aware of the problem beforehand, they will also help to train the public in what they should do in the event of large scale explosions, contamination and poisoning, and indeed civil emergencies in the shape of floods and other types of contagious diseases. That is neither too difficult nor too expensive. 
 I suggest most strongly that knowledge dispels fear. In 1992 the Government of the day were perfectly happy to have the Metropolitan police announce that a bombing campaign in central London was about to take place, and to tell the public that if someone with an Irish accent asked to hire or borrow their vehicle or lock-up, they were to refuse, but instead were to report it to the police. The result was that the public became, in the phrase I have already used, part of the wider security family, and that bombing campaign was thwarted. The time has come for the Government to address the problem before drama, emergency and crisis occur on a large scale. Without implementing the two proposals in question, the Bill continues to be woefully impractical.

John Butterfill: It might be helpful for the Committee if I explain the effect of grouping amendments. Whether amendments immediately follow one another or come elsewhere in the Bill, they are grouped because they are complementary or interrelated in some way, thus allowing debate on a general subject to take place. That does not prevent the amendments from being voted on separately in the order in which they appear in the Bill. They are grouped simply to facilitate a general discussion on the subject matter, which may be complementary or in
 some way related. I hope that that is helpful to members of the Committee.

Douglas Alexander: We have had a useful and educative discussion. I have certainly learned something this afternoon, because I did not know that pillar boxes were supposed to change colour in the event of a serious gas attack in the second world war.
 The substantive point made by the hon. Member for Newark bears serious consideration and I shall endeavour to offer a serious response. The Government cannot support the amendment; in fact, we shall resist it. The hon. Gentleman seemed to grasp the nub of the argument in his concluding remarks, when he contended that the generic advice of ''go in, stay in, tune in'' would in certain circumstances be wrong. However, there is a glaring logical inconsistency in going on to argue that it is possible in such circumstances to provide the general public with information on every conceivable threat that they may face that manifests itself as a civil contingency. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that serious thought has been given and continues to be given in the Government on what advice it would be appropriate to offer the people of the UK. 
 In the event of an incident, the Government would uphold the long-established practice of saying that members of the public should follow the advice of the emergency services on the ground. That is important and bears repetition. It is also important to recognise the fact that we have an emergency broadcasting system and existing arrangements to ensure the rapid dissemination of public warnings through a range of radio and television services, including Ceefax, Teletext and websites. Today of all days, I should perhaps pay tribute to the BBC on both ''Connecting in a Crisis'', which does great service, and the range of media employees who have worked with the Government to ensure that the emergency broadcasting system is fit for purpose. 
 It also bears repetition that public safety is of course the Government's first responsibility in all decisions on warning and informing the public. If a warning is necessary to protect public safety in the face of a specific and credible threat, we shall issue one without hesitation, as well as any further information that will help people to respond effectively to the circumstances in which they find themselves. 
 The amendment addresses the important question of what role the public should play in emergencies, which some respondents raised in the public consultation exercise for the draft Bill. I recognise that the issue is of wider interest. The Government appreciate that the behaviour of the public during emergencies can impact on the effectiveness of the response. In some circumstances, the public may be better able to help themselves, thereby reducing the burden on the emergency services. 
 The public can also be encouraged to avoid taking action that hinders the emergency services, which is why the Bill contains provisions on informing the public. Clause 2 places a duty on category 1 responders to publish elements of their civil protection work, in so far as that is desirable for 
 preventing an emergency or mitigating its effects. Those provisions will ensure that the public understand what plans are in place and their relationship with them. However, training goes well beyond information–it is not a matter of explaining to people what might happen to them or the actions that others might take. Training involves the instruction of people in what action individuals should take when an emergency arrives and suggests a more proactive response from those individuals. 
 The Government appreciate that the idea of civil protection training is not new, not least in the context of the civil defence arrangements for fear of a nuclear war, as described by the hon. Member for Newark. Those arrangements have long since ceased to be operational and many have called their effectiveness into question, and did so at the time. 
 Such training is not consistent with the modern approach of integrated emergency management. That is why we believe that the Bill as drafted strikes the right balance.

Oliver Heald: Obviously, there is a range of threats and the Minister is right to say that we cannot cover them all in advance, but under some threats the action required from the public is counter-intuitive. For example, if an anthrax attack takes place in a building, I understand that it is better to stay there and be vaccinated, rather than fleeing the scene. In a situation such as the one mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Newark involving a dirty bomb, it is much better to stay put to receive the treatments. Should it not be part of the Government's job to promote training in the workplace and through schools, in a sensible way that does not create panic, so that people understand those counter-intuitive situations? If not, I do not see how things will work. Will the Minister address that?

Douglas Alexander: I shall endeavour to do so. One of the key obligations in those circumstances is to minimise confusion and maximise control so that the emergency services can operate. In that regard, I think the hon. Gentleman's recognition of the fact that divergent responses are appropriate to divergent threats is important.
 Rather than have a position during a genuinely frightening and catastrophic incident whereby members of the public become involved in a potentially prolonged discussion as to which response is appropriate, and given their lack of knowledge of the threat, it is eminently sensible to build a communications strategy around the principle of communication used in such emergencies for many years, which is to seek the advice of the emergency services on the ground. 
 In that sense, the best way in which we can uphold the position of the emergency services and offer the assurance that the British public would want is to be absolutely clear about the fact that the people best equipped to make judgments on widely divergent responses in the face of divergent threats would be the emergency services. A response to any incident, including chemical or biological incidents, would 
 depend on a number of factors: what the danger is, who is affected by it and how best to contain the incident in those circumstances. I do not think that it is illegitimate to argue–indeed, it is the sensible approach–that trained personnel from the emergency services are best placed to decide the appropriate response in the circumstances.

Oliver Heald: I fully understand the point that at the scene it is obviously sensible to follow the advice of the emergency services. Nobody would disagree with that, but what is wrong with giving people public information in advance? They would at least have some knowledge of the likely threats and of what the emergency services were likely to say to them, particularly as some advice would be the opposite of what one would logically think. I do not disagree with what happens on the spot, but why cannot we do some work in advance? That certainly seems sensible.

Douglas Alexander: During our deliberations earlier in the week, the hon. Member for Ribble Valley spoke with enthusiasm about the UK Resilience website–[Interruption.] I was just about to say that I think it would be unfair to contend that no material is available. The Government's long-standing position has been to seek to strike the appropriate balance to ensure that the British public are alert but not alarmed.
 In circumstances where a specific threat has to be brought to the attention of the British public, we have ensured that the appropriate advice will be offered without hesitation. However, the point endures that in circumstances of a catastrophic or serious civil contingency, the right response for the Government is to ensure that the emergency services are able to direct the public. I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Patrick Mercer: I am most grateful to the Minister for his clear outline of where the Government stand. My concern is underlined by the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire. Almost everything that the Minister said indicated that the provisions for public information and training would be retrospective rather than proactive.
 We are perfectly content to train our children in schools on how to avoid being knocked down on the road, how to avoid the common problems of a house fire or, as I saw last week in Retford in my constituency, to train children to deal counter-intuitively with the problem of boiling chip fat being poured on them and their catching fire. None of that training takes place once the incident has occurred. 
 For instance, it is no good going up to a child who has been knocked over in the road and saying, ''Now, if you'd looked left and right and watched the traffic, you wouldn't have been knocked over.'' All such training should be proactive–to prevent injury, to prevent crisis and to act as a contingency plan. The Minister says that, given the number of emergencies that we are likely to face, preparing for those emergencies would probably be more confusing than helpful. I differ strongly with him on that. 
 I turn to my experience of Northern Ireland. People there were trained to deal with four broad circumstances: a bomb that was about to go off; a bomb made of high explosive; an anti-personnel bomb; and a bomb that had just gone off. The Minister could have made sensible arguments to suggest that those four contingencies would indeed have been confusing–each required a different reaction. 
 Without becoming even more tedious than normal, I would suggest that there are a number of simple, broad expedient situations that can be trained and prepared for. That is why I believe we must both inform people beforehand about where the dangers lie and train them properly to deal with such events before they occur, rather than when they have occurred. 
 I am particularly concerned about public awareness. We can happily get across the idea of fire regulations, for example, once people understand how to deal with fire. Looking around the Room, I cannot see the fire instructions, but I am sure that there are some, which are perhaps in the Corridor. We have fire extinguishers, fire alarms and fire drills in place, which represent campaigns of public information and of public training. I see little difficulty, and little expense, in combining what we have to deal with fire with, for example, four simple contingencies to deal with the most likely threats that the Bill addresses.

Oliver Heald: My hon. Friend will be aware that in schools these days young people learn about citizenship. Does he see school as an obvious place in which they could learn some basic aspects of civil protection?

Patrick Mercer: I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for his useful and informed intervention. I answer his question by referring to a campaign called Firewatch, which is being conducted in the east midlands by the fire brigades, with a view to doing exactly what he has just mentioned. It aims to ensure that children understand how to react–probably counter-intuitively–and his suggestion is sensible and practical.

Douglas Alexander: I would like to comment before the hon. Gentleman moves on. It seems that the central charge he lays at the Government's door is a lack of proactivity in this area. Does he not accept that the purpose of part 1 is proactively to plan for the contingencies that we are discussing? However, clause 2(1)(f) contains the specific obligation
''to arrange for the publication of all or part of assessments made and plans maintained under paragraphs (a) to (d) in so far as publication is necessary or desirable for the purpose of . . . preventing an emergency''.
 Is there not, therefore, more common ground in the Committee than his remarks suggest?

Patrick Mercer: I am grateful to the Minister for his comments. He will no doubt remember my closing words on Second Reading, when I said that I hoped that the Bill would be made to work effectively and that the Opposition broadly supported it. I take his
 point about the provision that he mentioned, but the fact remains that more must be done physically to help local authorities with public information campaigns and training. That is why we have tabled the amendment. Those activities will have to receive central and national endorsement, direction and funding if they are to work.
 I am not content with the answers that I have received, so I will press the amendment to a vote. Should it go against us, I have no doubt that we shall return to the point on Report. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:–
The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 7.

Question accordingly negatived.

John Butterfill: The hon. Member for Newark has twice referred to returning to amendments on Report, but I should point out the fact that it is not possible to return to those that have been debated and, in particular, voted on in Committee. It is sometimes possible to deal with those that have been debated but not voted on, although that is at the discretion of Mr. Speaker. I hope that is helpful.

Oliver Heald: On a point of order, Sir John. We are grateful for your guidance, but if an amendment on a matter central to the Bill was tabled in an entirely different form on Report, might it not be open to those in charge of the selection of amendments to look favourably on it, given that it relates to a matter of such importance?

John Butterfill: That is always possible, particularly if the amendment that is tabled on Report differs materially from the one that was discussed in Committee, even though it may relate to the same general subject. However, an amendment would need to be important and materially different.
 Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6 - Disclosure of information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Richard Allan: Clause 6 is important but horribly technical. It is of interest to those who are interested in data protection legislation and the like, and I can see that the Minister is glad that someone is speaking to it for that reason. The clause is potentially of interest to the business community, because it will allow category 1 responders to insist that they are provided with information. Regulations 29 to 34 of the draft regulations govern that provision of information,
 and it is worth examining how that will work in practice.
 As we have already discussed, the nightmare scenario for a telecommunications provider would be if a local authority insisted on being provided with reams of information to plan for the failure of the telecommunications network, the provision of which was so onerous as to be potentially damaging to the provider's business interests. The question of what information has to be provided could be one of the crunch areas between the category 1 responders and commercial sector responders. 
 I have specific questions about the draft regulations that correspond to the clause under debate. Regulations 30 and 31 define the circumstances under which the provision of data under clause 6 can be refused. Certain circumstances are set out under which 
''the responder must not comply with the request''.
 It interesting that it does not say that a responder can choose not to supply data, but that they ''must not'' provide the data. 
 The provisions outlined in regulations 32 and 34 for the safeguarding of data that has been provided under clause 6 are welcome and should be in place. In particular, regulation 34 relates specifically to security. However, when we discuss these matters–the issue of data and information comes up in so many legislative contexts–the regulations often lack teeth because no penalties or sanctions are imposed if someone does not comply with them. 
 Under the Data Protection Act 1998, measures could be taken to deal with a breach of sensitive personal data. Therefore, if a category 1 responder requests data of a sensitive personal nature under clause 6 and discloses it inappropriately, Data Protection Act provisions would apply and action could be taken. However, a lot of other data, especially of a commercially sensitive nature, would not be covered under the Data Protection Act. Local authorities could ask a telecommunications provider for all of its data and could, either by accident or design, disclose one company's sensitive commercial data to a competitor company. That could cause all kinds of damage, yet there are no sanctions. They are mandated in the regulations not to do that kind of thing, but there is no sanction regime were they to do so. Someone who used the clause 6 powers inappropriately would not face action unless they had breached the sensitive personal data provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998.

Alistair Carmichael: May I draw to my hon. Friend's attention the provisions of clause 10 on enforcement, which would apply to orders made under clause 6(6).

Richard Allan: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing that to my attention, but the enforcement action that he refers to would be taken against those who refuse to comply with a request for data. I am talking about the person with the data using it inappropriately. So far as I can see, we cannot take action against them. Although people are being asked to do certain things, there are no sanctions.
 I take an interest in data protection and the security of information. Quite sensibly, we have a growing awareness of the value of data. When talking about sensitive commercial data, especially in connection with the utilities, some kind of sanction is needed to back up the instruction to the local authority to keep that data secure. It is worth pointing out that there is a gap. I hope that the Minister will respond briefly, but I did not want let clause 6 disappear without having raised the subject.

Alistair Carmichael: I can be similarly brief. I share the general thrust of my hon. Friend's argument, although as I read it–the Minister may correct me–the clause is about the transfer of information between bodies who are category 1 respondents; essentially, they would be the public bodies listed in schedule 1. However, I am concerned about the structure of schedule 1.
 Obviously, there is no power under this part of the Bill for a Scottish Minister to require either the British Transport police or the Secretary of State, as far as his functions relate to maritime and coastal matters, to be the recipient of information from bodies listed under part 2. That seems to be an obvious defect. If the power under clause 6 is necessary–on balance, it probably is–it ought to extend to information to be provided to those bodies. Given recent concerns about the operation of the Data Protection Act, and especially the difficulties experienced by police forces in England and Wales about sharing information in relation to the Soham murders, the power should be expressed in the Bill.

Douglas Alexander: I shall first address the remarks of the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael). One of my final acts before leaving the Department to come here was to sign a letter to the hon. Gentleman in relation to points that he raised on the construction of the schedules, and I extend my apologies if that letter has not yet reached him. Perhaps we could delay discussion of the merits or demerits of the structure of the schedules until he has received that correspondence. I will then be happy to address any remaining points that he wishes to raise.
 The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam raised a number of points. As he suggests, the clause is worthy of a few moment's deliberation. First, I make it clear that each respondent will be subject to the same obligations as apply to the safeguarding of material under the regulations. In addition, the draft regulations provide that when a responder has been asked for sensitive information, and that responder has reasonable grounds to believe that disclosing the information would impair the confidentiality of the information, the responder must not comply with the request. That was the statutory construction that caused some concern and interest to the hon. Gentleman. 
 The importance that we attach to ensuring the confidentiality of personal or commercial information is reflected in the phraseology of the statute. It supports the seriousness of our concern. All the safeguards contained in the Data Protection Act about fair and lawful processing and the conditions 
 in which information is held will continue to apply. Possible sanctions were mentioned, and the unauthorised use and disclosure of the information will constitute breach of confidence and can give rise to legal action in the normal way, subject to the usual defence of just cause. Clause 10 will apply to those who breach regulations that restrict the disclosure of information. 
 I hope that that has covered all the points. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7 - Urgency

Patrick Mercer: I beg to move amendment No. 19, in
clause 7, page 7, line 12, leave out 'thinks' and insert 
 'genuinely believes on reasonable grounds'.

John Butterfill: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 26, in
clause 8, page 7, line 35, leave out 'think' and insert 
 'genuinely believe on reasonable grounds'.
 No. 38, in 
clause 21, page 13, line 37, leave out 'thinks' and insert 'believes on reasonable grounds'.
 No. 39, in 
clause 21, page 13, line 39, leave out 'thinks' and insert 'believes on reasonable grounds'.

Patrick Mercer: I hope that I can deal with the amendments quickly, much to everyone's relief.
 This is a simple point. The Bill revolves around the most serious style of emergency that the country is likely to face. I fully understand that, by definition, emergencies are unlikely to be clear, but events will move quickly and reports will be confusing, I believe that we need a stronger phraseology to ensure that the emergency powers do not appear to be imposed on a whim. 
 That is why I believe that the phrase ''believes on reasonable grounds'' should replace ''thinks''. It would suggest that Ministers who are responsible for imposing the powers have had the difficulties explained to them to the best of their knowledge and understanding and that their decision is made after a balanced and due process of thought and discussion. The word ''think'' suggests uncertainty and that Ministers may react viscerally rather than in a balanced fashion. That is why I believe that it is inadequate and that a stronger phrase should be used, namely ''believes on reasonable grounds''.

Richard Allan: I am glad to have the opportunity to debate the urgency provisions, and I thank the hon. Member for Newark for his introduction because there is an important test to consider.
 We seem to have tiered provisions throughout this part of the Bill. Ordinary regulations may be made under clause 2, and clause 5 provides for orders. Then, if the Government cannot use those, they can fall back 
 on the urgency provisions in clause 7. They would be the least desirable from the point of view of anyone who had to respond to an emergency, as it is clearly better for things to be done in an orderly fashion. 
 It is important to test the threshold at which we invoke the urgency provisions. The phrase ''thinks'' appears to be a lower threshold than what has been sensibly proposed by the hon. Member for Newark, which could be tested more robustly. That is the safeguard that we are looking for. We do not want the urgency provisions to kick in unless the situation is genuinely urgent, so the threshold over which the Minister must leap is relevant. 
 I hope that the Minister can put some flesh on the bones of the phrasing and explain the circumstances that would satisfy what is required by his wording and allow the urgency provisions to be triggered. I believe that there will be a lot of interest outside the House in things being done in an orderly fashion through the normal regulation and order-making process, rather than the last resort process in clause 7.

Douglas Alexander: I fully understand the hon. Gentleman's concern that Ministers should use the powers of direction under part 1 of the Bill, and the powers to make emergency regulations under part 2, in a reasonable fashion. I entirely agree with what the amendments are designed to achieve, but I must reject them, for reasons that I shall set out.
 Amendment No. 19–amendment No. 26 in the case of Scotland–proposes a requirement that a Minister 
''genuinely believes on reasonable grounds''
 that there is an urgent need for directions. However, it is unnecessary expressly to require a Minister of the Crown or Scottish Ministers to act ''reasonably'', because it is a tenet of public law in this country that Ministers are bound to act reasonably. Furthermore, expressly to require that in this context could be dangerous. A court considering this legislation and another enactment that did not expressly require a Minister to act reasonably might legitimately infer that Parliament had intended to allow the Minister to act unreasonably. 
 I can understand why hon. Members think that emergency powers are a special case and that it is therefore appropriate to be as full and forthcoming in the Bill as possible, even if the provisions are strictly unnecessary. The Government accept that part 2 of the Bill will need to be used only in extremis and that there is merit in drafting this part of the Bill as transparently as possible, but if including unnecessary material in the Bill would potentially cast doubt on the interpretation of other enactments, it would not be appropriate to include it. That principle holds good for part 2, notwithstanding the nature of the Bill. Even an enactment such as the Human Rights Act 1998 does not at any stage expressly require a Minister to act reasonably. That explains the Government's position and why we reject the amendments.

Patrick Mercer: I am grateful to the Minister and to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam. The point has
 been explained clearly, and I am content to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Patrick Mercer: I beg to move amendment No. 21, in
clause 7, page 7, line 19, leave out 
 'may be written or oral' 
 and insert 'shall be written'.

John Butterfill: With this we may discuss the following amendments: No. 24, in
clause 7, page 7, line 29, leave out subsection (5).
 No. 28, in 
clause 8, page 8, line 1, leave out 
 'may be written or oral' 
 and insert 'shall be written'.
 No. 31, in 
clause 8, page 8, line 11, leave out subsection (5).

Patrick Mercer: Again, this group of amendments deals with a not dissimilar point to the one that we made under the previous group. I fully understand that, in the event of an emergency, circumstances will always be difficult to judge. What concerns me is the fact that, by allowing a Minister or Ministers merely to give an oral instruction down the telephone, swingeing powers may be introduced without the proper course of thought having been gone through.
 British Telecom gave me a note that reflects clearly on that point. It states: 
''We believe that the ability to make oral directions where an emergency has not been declared is not warranted. If it is determined that speed is of the essence in establishing important requirements in such circumstances, then a written Notice under the hand of the relevant Minister should be issued to the relevant body or person. Oral directions are open to interpretation and abuse and it is difficult to envisage when oral direction would be necessary in a non emergency situation where speed of reaction cannot be that critical.''
 The note makes a sensible point, but I go further. According to all the principles of emergency planning in which I have ever been involved, there comes a point at which the word of the Minister, the officer or the incident commander simply must be backed up by something stronger. To delve back into history, there was an incident during the second world war when the German commander of the bridge at Remagen failed to give correct written orders. He gave only oral orders for the bridge to be blown up. As a result, the orders were misinterpreted; the bridge was not blown up. Fortunately for the British and indeed, the American and Allied cause, the bridge at Remagen was taken and the wall was considerably shortened. From the Nazis' point of view that was a most unfortunate incident. It has led, as no doubt other hon. Members will be able to tell us, to situations in the armed forces where crucial decisions have to be backed up in writing, although the executive order may be given orally. That applied in the British armed forces particularly where a bridge was to be blown up: a written order had to be given and an oral order was simply not good enough. 
 As a victim of my past experience I take issue with the idea that a Minister can impose such orders by word of mouth. I believe that it is as simple as that; an 
 oral order needs to be backed up by a written order. Perhaps in subsection (3) ''written or oral'' should be struck out and the phrase, ''shall be written'' inserted so that there can be no misunderstanding in these most serious of circumstances.

Richard Allan: Again, the hon. Gentleman does us a favour by picking up on the issue. The ability to give oral orders worried one of my colleagues to whom I spoke about the Bill, particularly in the context of part 1. Part 2 deals with what happens when an emergency has occurred. It is about Ministers perhaps having to take exceptional powers in those circumstances. Part 1 is about planning for emergencies. It is hard in that context to understand when there would be a requirement or necessity to give oral instructions under the terms of clause 7, which relates to an emergency situation in which written orders could not be prepared on issue.
 The grounds for confusion if oral instructions were given are apparent from the draft regulations. Are the instructions under clauses 2(3), 4(2) or 6(1) parallel to the incredibly complex draft regulations? They do not relate to orders that can be easily given down the telephone. It is not a question of picking up the phone and saying, ''You must do this.'' The only one that could sensibly be given in an oral form is draft regulation 13 in respect of compulsory plans, which has a blank space. It says, ''You must have a plan about–''. I can foresee circumstances in which a threat of a particular nature appears and a Minister might want to ring everyone up and say, ''You must have a plan about–'', but that is almost the only draft regulation that would fall within that category. 
 The other powers that concern us are in clause 4 and deal with business continuity. I fail to see the circumstances in which we could sensibly give a business continuity instruction or why business continuity would be such a priority that an instruction would have to be given in oral form. We must be clear that we are trying to limit the powers to do things exceptionally to exceptional circumstances where appropriate. Giving oral instructions is clearly exceptional. It will be much harder to establish the chain of accountability if anything goes wrong when instructions have been given. If someone wishes to challenge the instructions at a later date, which is perfectly possible under the Bill, it will be much more difficult with oral instructions. The idea that we are giving Ministers the power to make urgent oral instructions in relation to business continuity seems bizarre. 
 The other thing that I am not sure is necessary are the provisions in clause 6 relating to the disclosure of information. That might present a stronger case in that we may want to say to one category of people that they must share information with another, but I do not understand how that would be done for directions or regulations. As we have said, the regulations for clause 6 powers are complex and technical. I cannot imagine instructions on those being given orally. The only thing that could be dealt with orally is whether action is to be taken under the powers in that clause. The Minister must justify why oral direction powers are appropriate for part 1 activities generally rather than 
 for a much narrower range, particularly in respect of a compulsory plan for which there is scope to issue oral directions. The provision is more wide ranging than it needs to be. Our role is to keep things as narrow as possible.

Douglas Alexander: The Government cannot accept the amendments. Clauses 7 and 8 are designed to enable action to be taken by a Minister of the Crown in cases of urgency where there is insufficient time to make legislation. That exceptional power is designed to ensure that in cases of real urgency, the Government can arrange for coherent, effective action to be taken at a local level. There are circumstances during emergencies, or when they appear imminent, in which consistent, decisive action is necessary. Sometimes such action might be outside existing planning frameworks and at others it might not be apparent to local areas how best to deal with the situation. For example, there might be a sudden heightening of the terrorist alert state or a mass evacuation that requires responders urgently to reassess their plans for such an emergency.
 The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam suggested that these provisions are unnecessary because they are included in part 2. However, although there would be appropriate regulation powers under part 2, some circumstances would not merit the declaration of an emergency but would, none the less, require some quick, brief direction. That comes to the nub of the matter raised by the hon. Member for Newark, the central contention of which was that if an oral direction were given, it would be vital for it to be backed up with a written direction from the Minister. I think we would agree on that. Perhaps I can direct the hon. Gentleman to clause 7(5), which says: 
''Where a Minister gives an oral direction (or further direction) under this section he shall confirm it in writing as soon as is reasonably practicable.''
 I hope that we have addressed hon. Members' specific concerns and recognised the balance that needs to be struck between ensuring that there is speed of action where necessary and ensuring the rigour and clarity that would come from written communication. The Bill contains appropriate safeguards. Any oral direction must be confirmed 
''in writing as soon as is reasonably practicable.''

Stephen Pound: The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam talked about the chain of accountability. Is it implicit in the clause that a contemporaneous record should be kept? For example, in the Royal Navy a yeoman signaller would take notes of a superior officer's oral commands and those would later be confirmed in writing. Will a record be kept at the time of the oral direction to establish that chain of accountability and provide the basis for the subsequent written confirmation of the oral order?

Douglas Alexander: Clearly, the issue of whether minutes are taken during ministerial discussions has been a matter of some contention and interest in recent days in this House and other places. I find it inconceivable that there would not be a contemporaneous record of the Minister's direction
 in the serious circumstances that we are envisaging. None the less, the additional safeguard articulated in clause 7(5) would ensure that there is also a guarantee that any contemporaneous record taken by a civil servant would be full enough in terms of written communication thereafter. On that basis, I urge the hon. Member for Newark to withdraw his amendment.

Patrick Mercer: I thank the Minister for clearing up several misunderstandings, the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam for making his point so clearly and, indeed, one or two other Committee Members for their salty interventions.
 With my regrettably reasonably wide experience of emergencies, albeit not on the scale that the Bill foresees, everything that I have heard makes me cautious. As e-mail moves at the speed of light or sound–or however quickly it moves–an oral instruction can quickly be backed up with a written one provided that e-mail continues to exist during a state of emergency. On that basis, despite my reservations, the Minister has made things clearer, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Patrick Mercer: I beg to move amendment No. 22, in
clause 7, page 7, line 27, after 'given', insert 
 'or when the Minister accepts that the emergency (as defined in section 1) has ended, whichever is the sooner'.

John Butterfill: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 23, in
clause 7, page 7, line 28, at end insert 
 'but the Minister may extend the direction for a further 21 days'.
 No. 29, in 
clause 8, page 8, line 9, after 'given', insert 
 'or when the Ministers accept that the emergency (as defined in section 1) has ended, whichever is the sooner'.
 No. 30, in 
clause 8, page 8, line 10, at end insert 
 'but the Ministers may extend the direction for a further 21 days'.

Patrick Mercer: I am most grateful for the opportunity to make what the Committee will be pleased to hear is a brief series of comments. I hope to change ''21 days'' to the period in the amendment. That strikes me as being thoroughly practical. If anything, it will make the powers less difficult to impose and will allow the Minister more flexibility in dealing with a problem. Different problems will require different sorts of solutions, different powers and the implementation of different types of power. The Bill's phrasing suggests that the imposition of the powers will lie in blocks of 21 days. I hope to give more flexibility and to allow Ministers to bring the state of emergency to an end rather more quickly.

Richard Allan: This is another helpful group of amendments from the hon. Gentleman. We are right to question the extent to which any direction that has been given under an emergency power should stay in force. There is only one set of circumstances in which we might bring forward urgent powers rather than
 introducing regulations in the normal fashion, and that is after we have passed all the threshold tests to show that we could not bring a regulation to the House in the normal manner.
 To accept that there could be urgent conditions is not to accept that any regulation that is brought forward through the urgency provisions should stay in force indefinitely. The Government have proposed a 21-day limit. The hon. Gentleman's wording suggests that it could be reduced. I am curious about that, because my understanding is that the powers in this part of the Bill concern not situations once an emergency has been declared but those before one happens. For that reason, it is odd to debate something that would repeal powers when the emergency is over since they would concern circumstances in which there was no emergency. We would be dealing with the emergency regulations in part 2 if an emergency had occurred. 
 That brings us to the important matter of how long regulations should stay in force. What is the Government's intention? If they cite the urgency provisions in clauses 7 and 8, how confident can we be that they are committed not to say that the directions are good and should be left in force for the foreseeable future, then just keep renewing them because they seem all right? 
 From a democratic point of view, it would be far more acceptable for there to be a clear statement that urgent regulations will be dropped as soon as possible and that the Government will then introduce regulations through the normal procedure. They might be identical, but it would be helpful if there were a clear disconnection between those introduced as urgent provisions and those that come about in the normal way, so that we could continue to maintain the constitutional nicety of regulations always coming through this place, except where there were urgent requirements. Then, when there were urgent requirements, the regulations would clearly be in a different category and would not be proceeded with for any longer than was strictly necessary. That is the kind of clarification that we seek. It is important in the context of the part 1 regulations, but we shall see when we debate part 2 next week that anything that is significant in the context of part 1 is significant to the nth degree in the context of part 2, where the powers that could be contained in the regulations will be of a different order of magnitude.

Douglas Alexander: I regret that the Government cannot accept the amendments. Clauses 7 and 8 are designed to enable action to be taken by a Minister of the Crown in cases of urgency and where there is insufficient time to make legislation. Amendments Nos. 22 and 29 would, in addition, provide that the direction ceases to have effect when
''the Minister accepts that the emergency . . . has ended''.
 This misunderstands the purpose of clause 7. Directions may be given when there is no emergency–for example, there may be an outbreak of a disease overseas, which did not presently threaten the United Kingdom, but which could in future. All 
 the Minister would have to be satisfied of would be that there was an urgent need to make provision. 
 Clause 7 provides that the Minister may give another direction after the first one has lapsed. There is no limit on the number of further directions that may be given. Amendments Nos. 23 and 30 would limit the number of successive directions to two. The amendments are largely unnecessary. Before making a further direction, the Minister must be satisfied that there is insufficient time for legislation to be made. In the case of a direction that contains provisions, which could be made by way of a negative resolution instrument–that is provisions relating to planning business continuity management promotion and information sharing, which could be made under clauses 2, 4 or 6–it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which it would not be possible to prepare and make legislation before the first direction elapsed. 
 In the case of directions that contain further provision requiring a responder to exercise one of its functions, the relative legislation and order under clause 5 would be subject to affirmative resolution. It might not be possible to ensure that an affirmative procedure has been completed before the first direction lapses, but that should be possible by the time the second direction lapses. 
 On how long it would take to make the secondary legislation under the provisions mentioned here, regulations under clauses 2, 4 and 6 are subject to the negative procedure. They could be made, and in urgent cases brought into force immediately, even before they were laid before Parliament, but it would still take time to draft the legislation and, in an emergency, even an hour's delay could be dangerous. Orders under clause 5 may be made only if a draft of the order has been laid before and approved by resolution of the Houses of Parliament. It would be necessary to prepare a draft order and to hold a debate in each House. The timing of the debate would obviously depend on the availability of the parliamentary time and there would be particular problems during an Adjournment or Recess. Once the draft order had been approved by both Houses, it would be necessary to make a final order. Therefore, we do not believe it is necessary to support the amendments, and we do not believe it is necessary that the regulations should remain in force for only 21 days. Indeed, the Bill under clause 7(4)(b) requires the Minister 
''to revoke the direction as soon as is reasonably practicable.''
 On that basis I hope I have given sufficient comfort that the hon. Gentleman will feel little need of further amendments.

Patrick Mercer: I am grateful to the Minister for his very clear exposition and to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam for his views. I think that I accused the Government earlier of a lack of fresh thinking and innovation. Certainly, from what I have just heard–sensible, and may I say seamanlike, precautions are to be taken before such time as contagion, disease or another problem actually spreads to these shores–is
 indeed fresh and innovative thinking, and on that basis I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9 - Monitoring by Government

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Richard Allan: It is worth pausing for a brief moment on clause 9, because we referred earlier to how we will know that local government and all the authorities referred to are actually doing what they should be doing. How can we maintain some kind of quality control over contingency planning, which will be spread around the country?
 I am curious about clause 9. The explanatory notes say that clause 9 will allow the Government–Scottish Ministers or a Minister of the Crown, in the case of England and Wales– 
''to require a Category 1 or Category 2 responder to provide information which relates to the performance of their functions under Part 1 of the Bill. It is likely that this power will be used to support the functions of making secondary legislation under Part 1 and of taking enforcement action under clauses 10 and 11.''
 What seems curious is that that is a generic power. The Liberal Democrats have called for assurances that there will be an inspection and performance monitoring regime. However, no detail is given. The explanatory notes say: 
''It is likely that this power will be used''.
 The clause therefore says that the Government will have the power to act, but we have no detail on how they envisage things actually happening or how such powers will be used. Can the Minister give an early indication of the Government's proposed monitoring regime for part 1?

Patrick Mercer: Clause 9 strikes me as being in direct opposition to clause 7, which talks in such detail about ''urgency''. Clause 9 strikes me as micro-management of the worst sort. It lacks an understanding of the nature of an emergency and makes something of a mockery of clause 7.

Douglas Alexander: In terms of the requirements of monitoring and measuring performance for public sector organisations, the Government propose that performance should be monitored through the usual auditing mechanisms, such as the Audit Commission for local authorities and the fire services inspectorate for fire brigades. If that proves insufficient, further action may be necessary. Clause 9 is designed to enable the Government and, in Scotland, Scottish Ministers, to obtain information from responders about the performance of their duties under part 1. It will support the legislation-making powers conferred by the Bill and will facilitate enforcement. I hope that I have answered the hon. Gentleman's query: I recollect that the Joint Committee recommended an entirely separate audit regime, but the Government remain
 minded to say that standing procedures, principally the Audit Commission, will be adequate for the task.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 10 to 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14 - Scotland: consultation

Douglas Alexander: I beg to move amendment No. 66, in
clause 14, page 9, line 37, at end insert– 
 '( ) A Minister of the Crown shall consult the Scottish Ministers before making an order under section 13(1)(a) adding an entry which relates wholly or partly to a person or body exercising functions in relation to Scotland.'.

John Butterfill: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 67 to 70.

Douglas Alexander: As the Committee will be aware, the Government, working closely with the devolved Administrations, seek to ensure that civil protection is offered in a coherent fashion throughout the UK. Clear and broad duties to consult will ensure that each regime is compatible with the others, and clauses 14 and 15 will achieve that. The amendments follow further discussions between the Government and the Scottish Executive. We have reconsidered the circumstances in which Scottish and UK Ministers should consult each other before exercising powers under part 1, and have concluded that the range of circumstances in which consultation is required should be extended.
 Amendment No. 66 requires a Minister to consult with Scottish Ministers before adding a new responder with functions in Scotland. That reflects the existing obligation on a Minister, before we exercise other powers under part 1 in relation to responders that have functions in Scotland; currently, they are the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the British Transport police and the Health and Safety Executive. 
 Amendments Nos. 67 to 70 require Scottish Ministers to consult a Minister before exercising any powers under part 1. The current obligation to consult is limited to the exercise of particular powers and excludes certain responders. The combined effect of the amendments is to ensure that, while the UK Government and Scottish Executive have responsibilities in the Bill that reflect the devolution settlement, they will exercise those responsibilities in a consistent way. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 67, in 
clause 14, page 9, line 38, at end insert– 
 '(a) '. 
 No. 68, in 
clause 14, page 9, line 40, after 'Part', insert '2 or'.
 No. 69, in 
clause 14, page 9, line 40, leave out 
 'other than paragraph 32 or 38'.
 No. 70, in 
clause 14, page 9, line 40, at end insert 
 ', or 
 (b) an order under this Part.'.–[Mr. Alexander.]
 Clause 14, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 15 to 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 - Category 1 and 2 Responders

Douglas Alexander: I beg to move amendment No. 71, in
schedule 1, page 22, line 33, after 'Ambulance', insert 'Service'.
 In the light of further consideration, it has become apparent that one technical amendment is required to schedule 1. Paragraph 16 specifies the Scottish ambulance board as a category 1 responder. The body's correct title is, of course, the Scottish Ambulance Service Board, and the amendment corrects that regrettable oversight. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Question proposed, That this schedule, as amended, be the First schedule to the Bill.

Alistair Carmichael: The Minister said earlier that he had written to me, but I have checked with my office, and there is no record of a letter having been received. If I have misunderstood schedule 1, this might be a helpful juncture at which to enlighten me.

Douglas Alexander: This has been a very busy week for the Government, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the letter should be with him. I do not have a copy in front of me, but I am endeavouring to be provided with one so that I can read it out in full. Suffice it to say that I went through the letter before signing it, and it explained the Government's clear rationale. It also made it clear that the hon. Gentleman's contribution had not brought to light an error. It should have arrived at his office by now, and if he has any further comments, I will endeavour to give them due consideration. The advice that we received was entirely in order.
 I have now been handed a copy of the letter, so let me help the hon. Gentleman by addressing a number of points. The letter notes that he wrote to me with several questions about schedule 1 and that I promised to write to him. It continues: 
''Determining how part 1 of the Bill should apply in the devolved administrations has given rise to a number of difficult issues.''
 Those have been the subject of a range of discussions between the Government and the Scottish Executive, as well as devolved authorities elsewhere. It goes on: 
''The two guiding principles have been coherence across the UK and consistency with the devolution settlements. This has been achieved by adopting an approach which differs in each constituent part of the UK as the devolution settlements themselves do, but that will achieve the same practical effect''.
 Given the hon. Gentleman's and, indeed, my own constituency considerations, I shall deal first with Scotland. The letter says that 
''civil protection is a largely devolved matter. Most of the bodies which are responders in England and Wales are, in Scotland, bodies which exercise devolved functions'',
 such as the Scottish Ambulance Service Board. The letter adds that, as a result of the consultation process that I mentioned 
''the Executive asked the Government to extend Part 1 of the Bill to Scotland. The Scottish Executive propose to bring a Sewel motion before the Scottish Parliament shortly'',
 I anticipated that motion earlier in our discussions. The letter continues: 
''In light of the devolution status of most of the responders in Scotland, it is appropriate for the Scottish Ministers to make secondary legislation in relation to their activities and to issue guidance to them. This is what the Bill provides.
To clarify which bodies are within the jurisdiction of the Scottish Ministers and which responders are within the jurisdiction of the UK Ministers, the draftsman has split Schedule 1 (list of Category 1 and 2 responders) into four parts. Part 1 lists those Category 1 responders who will be subject to secondary legislation and guidance issued by a Minister of the Crown. Part 2 list those Category 1 responders who will be subject to secondary legislation and guidance issued by the Scottish Ministers. Parts 3 and 4 list those Category 2 responders who will be subject to legislation and guidance issued by a Minister of the Crown and Scottish Ministers respectively.
However, there are certain bodies which exercise functions on a UK-wide basis which are primarily reserved. These bodies are the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Health and Safety Executive and the chief constable of the British Transport Police Force.''
 That is the matter that precipitated the hon. Gentleman's question. The letter continues: 
''The Government has agreed with the Scottish Executive that it should be for a Minister of the Crown to make secondary legislation and guidance in relation to these bodies. As a result, these bodies are listed in Parts 1 and 3 of Schedule 1. In light of the fact that these bodies do exercise functions in Scotland, Parts 1 and 3 are headed 'General' rather than 'England, Wales and Northern Ireland' or anything similar.''
 That is the point the hon. Gentleman raised. The letter continues: 
''Legislation and guidance made by a Minister of the Crown will apply to the activities of these bodies in Scotland. UK and Scottish Ministers will consult each other when making regulations or giving directions so as to promote a common framework across Great Britain.''
 That deals with the nub of the point that was raised. If it would be helpful to the hon. Gentleman, I should be happy to narrate the circumstances that relate to Northern Ireland. The letter explains both the title that was used–''General'' rather than ''England and Wales''–and indicates the careful thought and consideration that has been given in the amendment to the appropriate relationship between the Scottish Executive and the UK Government in those matters.

Alistair Carmichael: I am grateful to the Minister for his letter, and I look forward to considering its terms when I receive it. However, he has not cured the defect that arises under the operation of the disclosure of information under clause 6 (2). That states:
''Scottish Ministers may make regulations requiring or permitting one person or body listed in Part 2 or 4 . . . to disclose information . . . to another person or body listed in Part 2 or 4''.
 The power for disclosure between Parts 1 and 3 operates in the same way under clause 6 (1). If the Maritime Coastguard Agency requires information held by a chief constable or a local authority in 
 Scotland, there is no power for a Scottish Minister to order disclosure to the Maritime Coastguard Agency, the Health and Safety Executive or the chief constable of the British Transport police under Clause 6(2). That appears to be a defect. If I am wrong about that, can the Minister show me where?

Douglas Alexander: I am happy to concede the point. That may be a lacuna that we need to address. Given the complexity of drafting in that area, where matters need to be resolved not only by ourselves but with the Scottish Executive and others, I will ensure that, if the
 lacuna that the hon. Gentleman has identified exists, I will take it back and discuss it with officials after today's committee. I will ensure that suitable technical amendments are proposed at a later stage to address the point.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to. 
 Further consideration adjourned.–[Ms Prentice.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at eight minutes past Five o'clock till Tuesday 3 February at half-past Nine o'clock.